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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
This case is before this court on appeal from the district 
court's order exonerating the Consolidation Coal Co. 
("Consol") from liability for injuries to its employee George 
Newman. This appeal presents complicated and unusual 
issues of admiralty procedure. Consequently, we set forth 
the convoluted procedural and factual history of this case 
at considerable length. 
 
I. CASE HISTORY 
 
A. Procedural History 
 
On April 27, 1989, Newman was injured while working as 
a deckhand for Consol. Thereafter, Newman and his wife 
filed suit against Consol in the Court of Common Pleas of 
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, asserting claims of 
unseaworthiness and negligence under the Jones Act, 46 
App. U.S.C. § 688. Subsequently, on July 20, 1990, 
invoking jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333, Consol filed 
suit in the district court pursuant to the Limitation of 
Liability Act ("Limitation Act"), 46 App. U.S.C. § 183, 
seeking exoneration from or limitation of any liability it may 
have had to the Newmans. As a matter of convenience, we 
will refer to Consol's case simply as the "limitation action." 
Pursuant to the Limitation Act, the district court enjoined 
the state court proceedings. See 46 App. U.S.C. § 185. 
 
After filing his claim in the limitation action (in which he 
demanded a jury trial), Newman moved on January 18, 
1991, to dissolve the stay of the state court proceedings. 
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The district court dissolved the injunction after Newman 
stipulated: 
 
 1. The Claimants waive any claim of res judicata 
based upon any judgment obtained in the State Court 
proceeding. 
 
 2. Consolidation Coal Company shall have the right 
to litigate all issues relating to its claim of limitation 
and exoneration of liability in the present proceeding. 
. . . 
 
 3. The issue of valuation of the limitation fund shall 
remain an issue to be resolved by the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. 
. . . 
 
App. at 132. At the same time, the district court 
administratively dismissed the limitation action subject to 
reopening after conclusion of the state court proceedings. 
Newman entered into this stipulation even though he could 
have rejected it. He instead could have appealed to this 
court from the denial of a motion to dissolve the injunction 
if the district court refused to dissolve the injunction 
without the stipulation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). 
 
The case then continued in the state court where in 
November 1991, Newman (his wife had withdrawn her 
claims) obtained a verdict finding Consol negligent and the 
vessel unseaworthy and setting Newman's damages at  
$1,327,000.1 With the exception of an issue concerning 
interest, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the 
judgment of the common pleas court; it thus did not 
disturb any of the jury's factual findings. The Pennsylvania 
and United States Supreme Courts then respectively denied 
petitions for allocatur and certiorari. 
 
On June 15, 1995, Newman moved to have the limitation 
action revived.2 After the court restored the case, Newman 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The jury also found Newman 11.83% contributorily negligent. The 
state court molded the verdict to $1,244,519.50 after making certain 
adjustments we need not detail. 
 
2. The evidence at the trial showed that the tug and barge had a total 
value of $120,000, far less than the damages Newman recovered in the 
state court. 
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filed a motion seeking to have the district court adopt the 
findings of the state jury, but the district court denied that 
motion. Newman then appealed that denial to this court 
and petitioned this court for a writ of mandamus to grant 
him similar relief. We, however, dismissed the appeal, 
which clearly was not from a final judgment, and denied 
the petition for a writ of mandamus. The district court 
thereafter adopted the jury's assessment of damages. 
Accordingly, the district court at a bench trial heard the 
limitation action de novo on liability as well as on certain 
admiralty issues, which we need not here set forth. The 
district court found in favor of Consol on liability, rendering 
the remaining issues moot. 
 
B. Factual History 
 
At the time of his injury, Consol employed Newman as a 
deckhand. On April 27, 1989, Newman was serving in that 
capacity on a tug, the M/V Elizabeth, with Timothy Stinson 
as the pilot. The Elizabeth was being used to move an 
empty barge, No. 1029, from Consol's repair yard, across 
the Monongahela river a couple of hundred yards to afleet 
of empty barges. 
 
Barge 1029 was about 175 feet long, 26 feet wide and 10 
feet deep. Stinson and Newman were inserting Barge 1029 
into a row of the empty fleet after removing another barge 
to the repair yard. Newman was using a rope, or leaving 
line, to tie Barge 1029 to the adjoining barge at the half- 
head. Newman already had attached the ends of the barges 
with wires. Stinson testified that he looked away briefly, 
and when he turned back, "Mr. Newman was going through 
the air backwards with a little bit of force . . . ." App. at 
1224. Newman has no memory of the accident. Newman fell 
into the bottom of the barge, hitting his head and severely 
injuring himself. Stinson said he saw part of the line still 
attached to the half-head, and part down with Newman. 
Stinson untied the barge and took it back across to the 
repair facility to bring Newman to medical aid. 
 
Newman was lifted out of the barge and set on the bank 
to await an ambulance. Michael Hughes, Consol's assistant 
operating manager in 1989, retrieved the piece of the line 
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from the bottom of the barge. Thomas Brown, the foreman 
at the repair facility, removed the piece of line with the eye 
from the half-head. Hughes then took possession of the 
whole line, put it in his office, and later bagged and labeled 
it. The line was taken to the Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory 
for analysis by Clarence Clegg. Warren Orr (the port 
captain), and Louis Truntich (assistant foreman) both 
testified that they observed the line after the accident and 
thought it had been cut. Brown stated that the line did not 
look freshly cut but instead was old and worn. Clegg, 
Consol's expert witness, testified that the rope had been cut 
with a sharp instrument, except for a few strands on the 
outside which could have broken under tension. All the 
Consol employees who testified stated that the standard 
practice was for the person using a line to inspect it and 
replace it if worn out, although Consol did not have a 
written policy to this effect. New leaving line was available 
for deckhands needing to replace old line. 
 
On July 18, 1996, the district court entered its decision 
and order exonerating Consol from liability, finding that 
there was neither unseaworthiness nor negligence. The 
court found as a fact that Newman slipped and fell, and 
that the line was cut through entirely after the accident. 
This result obviated the need for the district court to decide 
the limitation of liability issues. Newman then appealed. We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
On appeal Newman argues that the district court 
improperly forced him to stipulate that he would not claim 
any res judicata effect from the state court judgment; he 
also challenges as violative of the Seventh Amendment the 
denial of his motion to adopt the state jury findings. 
Newman also argues that the district court's factual 
findings on the exoneration issue were clearly erroneous. 
He further contends that the court's exclusion, as a 
subsequent remedial measure, of a Consol safety memo 
issued about Newman's accident was erroneous as was its 
denial of a motion he made to dismiss the limitation action 
by reason of the spoliation of evidence. He predicated the 
spoliation argument on the contention that if the line was 
cut after the accident Consol must have cut it. 
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II. DISCUSSION 
 
A. Standard of Review 
 
This appeal highlights two areas for review. The first 
arises from the legal consequences flowing from the 
circumstance that the accident led to both state and federal 
court proceedings. This area is essentially legal in 
character. The second area of inquiry focuses on the trial 
itself. We have plenary review over the district court's legal 
determinations. Universal Minerals, Inc. v. C.A. Hughes & 
Co., 669 F.2d 98, 102 (3d Cir. 1981). But we must affirm 
the district court's factual findings unless they are clearly 
erroneous. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a); FMC Corp. v. United States 
Dep't of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 838 (3d Cir. 1994) (in 
banc). 
 
We review the district court's evidentiary rulings 
principally on an abuse of discretion standard. Glass v. 
Philadelphia Elec. Co., 34 F.3d 188, 191 (3d Cir. 1994). We 
exercise plenary review, however, of its rulings to the extent 
they are based on a legal interpretation of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence. Barker v. Deere and Co., 60 F.3d 158, 161 (3d 
Cir. 1995); Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1496 (3d Cir. 
1993). We review the court's decision on the motion seeking 
a dismissal by reason of spoliation of evidence on an abuse 
of discretion standard. Schmid v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool 
Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 78 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
B. Background Admiralty Law 
 
The Limitation Act provides that when a maritime 
accident occurs "without the privity or knowledge of [the] 
owner," the shipowner's liability "shall not ... exceed the 
amount or value of the interest of such owner in such 
vessel, and her freight then pending." 46 App. U.S.C. 
§ 183(a). A shipowner facing potential liability can file a 
complaint for limitation of liability in a federal district court 
which then is authorized to stay all other proceedings 
against the shipowner and receive all claims. 46 App. 
U.S.C. § 185; Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. Rule F(4). 
 
Under Rule F of the Supplemental Rules for Certain 
Admiralty and Maritime Claims, the shipowner "may 
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demand exoneration from as well as limitation of liability." 
See Texaco v. Williams, 47 F.3d 765, 769 n.19 (5th Cir. 
1995). Thus, a complaint under the Limitation Act is a two- 
step process. The district court, sitting in admiralty without 
a jury, first determines " `whether there was negligence; 
[second] if there was negligence, whether it was without the 
privity and knowledge of the owner; and [finally] if 
limitation is granted, how the [limitation] fund should be 
distributed.' " In re Complaint of Dammers & Vanderheide & 
Scheepvaart Maats Christina B.V., 836 F.2d 750, 755 (2d 
Cir. 1988) (quoting Universal Towing Co. v. Barrale, 595 
F.2d 414, 417 (8th Cir. 1979)). The claimant has the initial 
burden of showing negligence or unseaworthiness, and 
then, if the claimant is successful, the burden shifts to the 
shipowner to demonstrate a lack of privity and knowledge 
in order to obtain the benefit of limitation of liability. 
Bankers Trust Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 761 F.2d 943, 
948 n.14 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 
The exclusive admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts 
in Limitation Act actions directly conflicts with the "saving 
to suitors" clause of 28 U.S.C. § 1333, which preserves 
common law rights in certain maritime cases, including the 
right to a jury trial. See Gorman v. Cerasia, 2 F.3d 519, 524 
(3d Cir. 1993). There is a conflict because "[t]here is no 
right to a jury in actions instituted in admiralty, and the 
claimants are enjoined from pursuing common law actions 
in other forums." Dammers, 836 F.2d at 755 (citation 
omitted). The conflict derives from the Seventh Amendment, 
as the Amendment applies only to cases brought at 
common law, not those brought in admiralty. Waring v. 
Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441, 458-60 (1847). 
 
There are two exceptions to this exclusive admiralty 
jurisdiction over Limitation Act proceedings. Thefirst arises 
when the value of the vessel and its freight exceeds that of 
all claims, that is the fund is adequate to cover all claims 
filed against the owner. See Lake Tankers Corp. v. Henn, 
354 U.S. 147, 152, 77 S.Ct. 1269, 1272 (1957); Gorman,2 
F.3d at 524. The second exception arises when there is only 
one claimant whose claim exceeds the value of the vessel 
and its freight.3 In this case, because the second exception 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. If a single claimant's claim is for less than the value of the vessel and 
its freight, a limitation proceeding is not needed. 
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applied, the district court was obliged to dissolve the stay 
against other proceedings if Newman stipulated to the 
district court's exclusive jurisdiction to determine all issues 
relating to limitation of liability. See, e.g., Ex parte Green, 
286 U.S. 437, 438-40, 52 S.Ct. 602, 602-03 (1932); 
Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 540-44, 51 S.Ct. 243, 246- 
48 (1931); Gorman, 2 F.3d at 524. These stipulations must 
waive any claim of res judicata based on the state court 
judgment and concede the shipowner's right to litigate all 
limitation issues in federal court. Id. at 524-25; see also, 
Grant Gilmore & Charles L. Black, Jr., The Law of 
Admiralty § 10-19, at 871 (2d ed. 1975). 4 
 
C. Stipulations and Trial de novo 
 
Newman argues that the district court erred in denying 
his motion to adopt the factual findings of the state court 
jury on the liability issues and in trying the exoneration 
and limitation issues de novo. However, the case law is 
clear that in a single claimant/inadequate fund situation 
like this, the claimant is entitled to proceed in state court 
after making the appropriate stipulations. See , e.g., 
Langnes, 282 U.S. at 540-44, 51 S.Ct. at 247-48; Gorman, 
2 F.3d at 524. The requirement that the claimant waive any 
claim of res judicata from a state court judgment and 
concede the shipowner's right to litigate all limitation issues 
in federal court "has been accepted by federal courts for 
over half a century and is now beyond dispute." Id. at 524- 
25. Any factual findings by the state court jury thus will 
not bind the federal court in determining the shipowner's 
right to limitation. Id. at 528-29. The Seventh Amendment 
is inapplicable in such a situation because thefinding on 
the owner's privity and knowledge, which is critical on the 
limitation issue, is separate from the liability determination 
made by the state court. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In this opinion, we use the terms "res judicata" and "collateral 
estoppel" rather than "claim" or "issue" "preclusion" because the 
stipulation in the district court leading to the dissolution of the 
injunction against the state court proceedings was that Newman 
"waive[d] any claim of res judicata based upon any judgment obtained in 
the State Court proceeding." 
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The law is less clear on whether a shipowner has the 
right to litigate the issue of exoneration in federal court 
without regard to the findings in the state court, as the 
exoneration issue mirrors the liability determination that 
the state court makes. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit recently held in an exoneration and limitation of 
liability action that the liability issue should be determined 
in state court and the case should return to the federal 
court only to decide limitation issues if the claimant wins a 
judgment in excess of the limitation fund. In re Complaint 
of McCarthy Bros. Co./Clark Bridge, 83 F.3d 821, 828 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 361 (1996). The Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, has held that 
notwithstanding the inherent redundancy in having 
overlapping state and federal court proceedings, claimant 
stipulations can protect both "the shipowner's right to limit 
liability and [to] litigate the issue of exoneration in federal 
court. . . ." Texaco v. Williams, 47 F.3d at 769. See also 
Odeco Oil and Gas Co. v. Bonnette, 4 F.3d 401, 405 (5th 
Cir. 1993) (When "the claimants are so anxious to take 
advantage of the perceived magnanimity of South Texas 
juries that they are willing to stipulate essentially that they 
will submit to two trials -- the state court trial followed by 
a substantially redundant federal limitation proceeding -- 
this court is hard put to deny them."). 
 
In this case it is not necessary for us to take a position 
on how far a claimant's stipulations must go. In other 
words, we need not decide whether a district court, as a 
condition of dissolving the injunction against the state 
court proceedings, may insist that the claimant waive the 
res judicata effect of the state court finding on the liability 
issue because Newman has not preserved his right to raise 
this issue. Here, in the same manner as the claimants in 
Texaco v. Williams, Newman agreed by stipulation to waive 
any claim of res judicata regarding issues of both limitation 
and exoneration. Although the district court required 
Newman's stipulation as a condition of dissolving the 
injunction against the continuation of the state court 
proceedings, Newman could have refused to enter into the 
stipulation and then appealed the court's refusal to dissolve 
the injunction without the stipulation. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(a)(1) ("the courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of 
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appeals from: (1) Interlocutory orders . . . refusing to 
dissolve or modify an injunction. . . ."); see also Gorman, 2 
F.3d at 523.5 Because Newman did not take such an 
appeal, or even object to the form of the stipulations in the 
district court, we will not review the issue, see Dillinger v. 
Caterpillar, 959 F.2d 430, 447 (3d Cir. 1992), and Newman 
is now bound by the stipulations he made and cannot 
argue that the district court required them improperly.6 We 
therefore need not decide whether a claimant in a limitation 
action must waive the res judicata effect of the state court 
proceedings as to both limitation and exoneration issues in 
order to proceed in state court under the saving to suitors 
clause. We do indicate, however, that we have serious 
doubts that the claimant must do so; thus the district 
courts should not read this opinion as approving implicitly 
a requirement that the stipulation waiving the res judicata 
effect of the state court action include liability issues. 
 
D. Jury Trial and the Seventh Amendment 
 
Newman argues further that even if retrial of the 
exoneration issue in the federal court was appropriate, it 
should have been before a jury. Newman's problem here is 
that while Congress can provide for jury trials in admiralty 
cases, as it has done under the Jones Act, the Seventh 
Amendment does not provide a right to a jury trial in 
admiralty. Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 
16, 20, 83 S.Ct. 1646, 1650 (1963). While an admiralty 
claim may be heard by a jury when it is joined with a claim 
for which there is a right to a jury trial, id., Newman did 
not bring his Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims in 
federal court where he might have been able to obtain a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Newman's attorney conceded at oral argument that under Fifth Circuit 
case law he could have filed such an appeal, but contended that he 
could not in the Third Circuit. We find unpersuasive his argument that 
the plain language of section 1291(a)(1) differs depending on which 
circuit you are in. 
 
6. In addition, judicial estoppel would apply in this case. The district 
court dissolved the injunction based on Newman's stipulations. Newman 
cannot change position now and argue that those stipulations are not 
binding upon him. See Murray v. Silberstein, 882 F.2d 61, 66 (3d Cir. 
1989). 
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jury trial on the claims relating to exoneration. 7 See Simko 
v. C & C Marine Maintenance Co., 594 F.2d 960, 965 (3d 
Cir. 1979); Red Star Towing & Trans. Co. v. Ming Giant, 552 
F. Supp. 367, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). Instead, Newman 
brought his Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims in state 
court, and later entered into stipulations to stay Consol's 
exoneration/limitation action and return to state court 
where he won a jury verdict. Thus, the case in the district 
court was entirely an admiralty case which did not include 
a right to a trial by jury. See Cooper v. Loper, 923 F.2d 
1045, 1048 (3d Cir. 1991). We are not aware of any 
authority holding that a nonjury admiralty claim must be 
tried to a jury when it is not joined with another claim 
which carries a right to a jury trial. 
 
Newman seems to think that the district court retried his 
Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims. That belief is not 
correct. Those claims were tried in the state court. The 
district court tried only the limitation/exoneration action, 
an admiralty case for which there is no right to a jury trial. 
As we indicated in Gorman, 2 F.3d at 524, a proceeding 
under the Limitation Act is heard by a court sitting in 
admiralty without a jury. We will not allow a claimant in a 
limitation action to obtain consecutive jury trials in the 
state and federal courts through the device of 
characterizing his claim in the limitation action as being 
predicated on the Jones Act or unseaworthiness. Thus, no 
matter how Newman characterizes his claim in the 
limitation action, his claim was a part of that action. See In 
re McCarthy Bros. Co., 83 F.3d at 826 ("Claimants have no 
right to a jury in admiralty actions, and thus lose their 
right to pursue common law remedies before a jury when 
forced into admiralty court under the Limitation Act.") 
(citation omitted). 
 
In trying the admiralty action, the district court 
considered independently issues decided earlier by the state 
court jury, but reached a different result. Yet the 
inconsistency was entirely appropriate because Newman 
waived any claim to res judicata based on the state court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We, of course, do not rule that he could have obtained a jury trial in 
these circumstances as the situation we describe is not before us. 
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proceeding with respect to exoneration. We emphasize that 
we are not concerned here with a situation in which a 
claimant brings his Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims 
in a district court and then the shipowner brings a 
limitation action. 
 
Newman argues that by trying the exoneration issue de 
novo, the district judge was re-examining the facts found by 
the state court jury contrary to the Seventh Amendment. 
But the cases Newman cites on this point all involved 
situations where the trial or appellate court rejected or 
modified a jury's factual finding in the same case. Here, the 
jury findings were in a different forum. Normally, res 
judicata or collateral estoppel would apply in such 
circumstances because both the state claims and the 
exoneration/limitation action arose from the same set of 
events. Here, however, Newman explicitly waived any right 
to res judicata on the limitation and exoneration issues.8 
Thus, the Seventh Amendment did not forbid the 
independent examination in the admiralty case of the 
issues previously adjudicated in the state court case. 
Newman received a jury trial for those claims in the forum 
in which he was entitled to one. 
 
Adopting the facts found by the state court jury would 
mean that the state court proceedings had res judicata 
application on the exoneration issue and would eliminate 
Consol's right to litigate the exoneration issue in the district 
court. Such an application would be directly contrary to 
Newman's stipulation in the district court to Consol's right 
to litigate in the district court all issues relating to both 
exoneration and limitation. The district court did adopt the 
jury's findings on damages because the damages issue was 
not covered by Newman's waiver of res judicata. Thus, the 
state court trial was not a "complete nullity" as Newman 
now claims. Newman may consider his efforts in state court 
to have been a waste of time, given the final result, but he 
was the party who sought to be in state court, and as he 
entered into the stipulations which have led to this result, 
he must live with their consequences. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. This court in Gorman held that the term "res judicata" in a limitation 
action stipulation also encompasses the doctrine of issue preclusion. 2 
F.3d at 528-29. 
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E. District Court Factual Findings 
 
We turn now to the second area of inquiry on appeal, the 
area relating to the trial itself. Newman argues that the 
district court's factual findings in support of its decision to 
exonerate Consol from liability were clearly erroneous in 
several respects. First, he contends that Consol did not 
disclose in pretrial proceedings that it was claiming that the 
leaving line Newman used was cut after the accident. The 
evidence Newman has for this contention is one response 
from Consol's attorney at a pretrial conference. After 
Newman's attorney asked if the legal theory of the case was 
that the rope was cut after the accident, Consol's attorney 
said: "No, I don't believe that is the theory." App. at 1110. 
Newman does not mention, however, that the court 
responded first to Newman's attorney's inquiry by saying: 
"Well, that has been mentioned as one of the, certainly one 
of the theories. I don't know that that's, that is the, the 
theory." Id. Then, after Consol's attorney responded, the 
court said: "But they certainly have, I've seen it in their 
pretrial report, mentioned there." In the circumstances, 
Consol's attorney's statement easily can be seen as a 
response to the court that it was not the only theory, 
although it was a possible theory. 
 
This conclusion is consistent with Consol's earlier 
statements on the matter. Consol argued in its pretrial 
statements that the rope was cut, but it did not know when 
it was cut, and if it had been cut before the accident 
Newman should have seen it and replaced the rope. App. at 
88-89, 1086 ("It is presently unknown precisely when the 
rope in question was cut, or by whom it was cut, except 
that it was cut prior to being brought to Consolidation's 
marine ways landing after the alleged accident."). These 
statements are consistent with the court's factualfinding 
that Consol cannot be deemed to have waived or disclaimed 
the issue. 
 
Newman also argues that there is no evidence to support 
the court's finding that Newman slipped. Newman has no 
memory of the accident, and Stinson, the only witness, was 
looking away when Newman began to fall and only turned 
back when Newman already was falling backwards. Thus, 
Newman is correct that there is no direct evidence that 
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Newman slipped, nor could there be. The district court 
apparently inferred that Newman slipped after the court 
first found that the rope did not break, but was cut after 
the accident. We cannot find these factual findings clearly 
erroneous because there is clear support for them in the 
record. 
 
Clegg, the expert witness, testified that the rope had been 
cut almost entirely through except for a few yarns (of 156 
total yarns in the rope) on the outside of the rope which 
broke under tension. Newman appears to argue that the 
line was cut before the accident, but remained at least 
partly attached until Newman pulled on it so that it was the 
breaking of the remaining intact yarns that caused him to 
fall. This theory is consistent with the facts, but so is the 
one reached by the district court, that the rope was cut 
through after the accident. This conclusion is particularly 
plausible, because it would be fairly obvious if a rope was 
held together by only a few of 156 yarns, and Newman 
testified that he would have replaced bad line had he 
noticed it. We do not decide which version of the facts we 
find more probable. The district court decided that the rope 
was cut after the accident and we cannot say that this 
finding was clearly erroneous. 
 
Given the finding that the rope did not break, but was 
cut, a permissible if not a necessary inference to be drawn 
is that Newman slipped. He was walking along a 2-3 foot 
gunnel on the barge with large drop-offs on either side, a 
situation which presents a severe slipping hazard. We 
cannot find clear error in the conclusion that he fell in 
these circumstances. 
 
If the rope did not break, and was cut after the accident, 
then it was not defective. Newman's theory of liability for 
his unseaworthiness and negligence claims was that Consol 
provided defective rope. Newman offered no other evidence 
of Consol's negligence or the unseaworthiness of the tug 
and the barge. Inasmuch as the court found that the rope 
was not defective, and we affirm the factual findings 
supporting this conclusion, the legal finding that there was 
neither negligence nor unseaworthiness also must be 
affirmed. 
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F. Evidentiary Rulings 
 
Newman also challenges certain evidentiary rulings by 
the district court. Newman attempted to introduce a Consol 
safety memo regarding the accident. The memo, prepared 
May 2, 1989 (five days after the accident) by David 
Kreutzer, stated that an employee fell after a leaving line 
broke and cautioned all employees to inspect ropes 
carefully before using them. Consol objected that this 
memo was a subsequent remedial measure and thus 
inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 407, and the court agreed. 
While the dissent argues that the memo is not a 
subsequent remedial measure within the meaning of Rule 
407 because Newman only sought to admit the portion 
dealing with Consol's investigation of the accident, dissent 
at 19, there is authority supporting the exclusion of 
evidence of post-accident investigations under Rule 407. 
See Specht v. Jensen, 863 F.2d 700, 701-02 (10th Cir. 
1988) (upholding exclusion of press release detailing city 
investigation of incident and response to problem  
discovered);9; Alimenta v. Stauffer, 598 F. Supp. 934, 940 
(N.D. Ga. 1984) (excluding post-incident report and 
recommendations for improvement). Furthermore, Newman 
argues that the memo should have been admitted under an 
exception to Rule 407, as he contends that he offered the 
memo only to impeach the testimony of Truntich that the 
line looked like it had been cut with an ax. Thus, the 
district court properly considered the memo within the 
framework of Rule 407. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The dissent relies on Rocky Mountain Helicopter v. Bell Helicopter, 805 
F.2d 907 (10th Cir. 1996), for the proposition that post-event "tests or 
reports" are not within the ambit of Rule 407. See dissent at 19-20 n.3. 
Rocky Mountain dealt with tests and reports designed specifically to 
determine the nature of a problem, though, while the memo in question 
here was a "safety alert," app. at 1279. This "safety alert" was designed 
to alert Consol employees to a potential danger, worn lines, and advise 
them of measures to avoid this danger, closer inspection. This is 
inherently a subsequent remedial measure designed to prevent future 
accidents rather than an investigation or test "conducted for the purpose 
of . . . discover[ing] what might have gone wrong or right." Rocky 
Mountain, 805 F.2d at 918. Thus, Specht is more relevant to this case 
than Rocky Mountain. 
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It can be reversible error to exclude evidence of a 
subsequent remedial measure when it is offered entirely for 
impeachment purposes. Petree v. Victor Fluid Power, Inc., 
887 F.2d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 1989). Yet a court must interpret 
the impeachment exception to Rule 407 circumspectly 
because "any evidence of subsequent remedial measures 
might be thought to contradict and so in a sense impeach 
[a party's] testimony. . . ." Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 
F.2d 463, 468 (7th Cir. 1984) (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, the evidence offered for impeachment must 
contradict the witness's testimony directly. See Kelly v. 
Crown Equip. Co., 970 F.2d 1273, 1278 (3d Cir. 1992). 
Here, Truntich testified that the line appeared to him to 
have been cut by an ax. The Kreutzer memo described an 
accident where a line broke, presumably Newman's 
although no names were mentioned. But the memo does 
not directly contradict Truntich's testimony. Truntich only 
was offering his opinion of the appearance of the line 
immediately following the accident. As the Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit has held, there must be "a greater 
nexus between the statement sought to be impeached and 
the remedial measure than the case at bar." Harrison v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 981 F.2d 25, 31 (1st Cir. 1992). The 
district court thus correctly interpreted Rule 407 and did 
not err in excluding the evidence. 
 
It is also important to point out that, as we observed 
above, there was evidence that the line was not cut after 
the accident. Thus, when Kreutzer wrote his memo, it was 
entirely natural for Consol to give the warning it did. After 
all, it surely was appropriate to tell employees to inspect 
ropes before using them. 
 
Furthermore, the memo recited that it was based on 
Consol's "investigation." Thomas Brown testified that the 
line did not look freshly cut, but obviously the district court 
rejected that evidence at the trial. In the circumstances, it 
is hardly conceivable that the introduction of the memo at 
trial could have altered the outcome of the bench trial in 
this case. While the dissent suggests that the memo would 
have corroborated Brown's testimony, we do not see how it 
could have added any further corroboration to the evidence 
at the trial in the absence of a showing that the 
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"investigation" which led to Kreutzer sending the memo led 
to information not available at trial. As far as we are aware, 
Newman did not make any such showing. Certainly his 
brief does not say he did. 
 
The second evidentiary ruling that Newman challenges is 
the denial of his motion to dismiss this limitation action for 
spoliation of evidence. Newman argues that the denial of 
this motion is inconsistent with the court's factual finding 
that the rope was cut after the accident because if it was 
cut, Consol must have cut the rope and prevented Newman 
from examining it in one piece, or substituted a cut rope for 
the rope that broke. But the court's rulings are not 
contradictory. Consol employees testified that they retrieved 
the two pieces of the line once the barge was brought back 
to the repair facility and showed a chain of custody from 
that point forward. Stinson testified that he saw the line in 
two pieces after Newman fell and that he did not cut the 
line. Stinson admitted that there were cutting tools on the 
tug and that he handled the rope in removing Barge 1029 
from the empty fleet to take Newman to medical attention. 
The district court, faced with this testimony, could have 
discredited Stinson's contention that he did not cut the line 
and inferred that he did. There is absolutely no evidence 
that Consol substituted the cut line for a broken line, and 
Newman's argument that Consol cut the line is inconsistent 
with his theory that the line broke. Thus, there was no 
compelling reason for the court to find that Consol 
destroyed any evidence. In the circumstances, the court 
surely did not abuse its discretion in denying Newman's 




The order of the district court entered July 18, 1996, 
exonerating Consol from liability will be affirmed. Therefore, 
we need not consider Newman's arguments that Consol had 
privity and knowledge and thus is not entitled to limitation 
of liability. 
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McKEE, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part and concurring in 
part. 
 
I must respectfully dissent from part II.F. of the majority 
opinion. Although I concur with the rest of the majority's 
analysis, I believe that the district court erred in excluding 
the Kreutzer memorandum under Rule 407 of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence. Moreover, I do not believe that this error 
was harmless, and I would therefore remand for further 
proceedings. 
 
The condition of the rope or "leaving line" was crucial to 
the determination of Consolidation Coal's liability. Those 
lines are used to tie barges together and can, in good 
condition, withstand a force of over 18,000 pounds. The 
district court concluded that the leaving line Newman was 
holding when he fell had been cut. Clearly, if that line was 
cut after plaintiff fell, as the district court concluded, 
Consolidation Coal would not be liable. However, if before 
the fall, the line had been cut or was in defective condition, 
Consolidation may well be liable. See Earles v. Union Barge 
Line Corp., 486 F.2d 1097, 1104 (3d Cir. 1973) (A 
shipowner has a duty "to furnish a reasonably safe place 
for . . . one working aboard the barge to perform his chores 
. . . [The breach of that duty] results in liability for 
negligence when the breach proximately causes injury to a 
foreseeable person."). "[A] shipowner's duty to furnish a 
seaworthy ship is absolute and completely independent of 
his duty . . . to exercise reasonable care . . . ." Id. at 1105 
(internal quotations omitted); see also Edynak v. Atlantic 
Shipping, Inc., 562 F.2d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 1977). 
 
Louie Truntich, the assistant foreman at the time of the 
accident, testified that he saw the leaving line on the day of 
the accident after Newman's fall, and it appeared to have 
been "cut with an axe. . . . It was just a nice, smooth, 
straight cut." App. at 1271a. Newman sought to discredit 
this testimony by introducing a memo circulatedfive days 
after his accident by David Kreutzer, the top company 
official on the scene the day of the accident. That 
memorandum stated in part: 
 
 Our investigation showed that the line had suffered 
prior damage and although it was the normal 1-1/2 
 
                                18 
[inch] MPO leaving line typically used for this purpose, 
a close inspection should have pointed out the damage 
and the line should have been taken out of service . 
 
App. at 1279a (emphasis added).1 The district court 
excluded this evidence under Rule 407 of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence as a subsequent remedial measure presumably 
because the memo goes on to announce that, in the future, 
"careful examination of the rigging and lines shall be made 
prior to their use in any operation." App. at 1279a. Rule 
407 states: 
 
 When, after an event, measures are taken which, if 
taken previously, would have made the event less likely 
to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not 
admissible to prove negligence . . . . This rule does not 
require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent 
measures when offered for another purpose, such as 
. . . impeachment. 
 
Fed. R. Evid. 407. Certainly, if Newman sought to admit the 
memo's language about examining the lines, then Rule 407 
would be implicated. The record clearly reflects, however, 
that Newman only sought to admit that portion related to 
the company's investigation into his accident.2 I do not 
believe that this proffered evidence was within the scope of 
Rule 407. Therefore, I would remand this case to the 
district court for a determination of whether that evidence 
could have been excluded on other grounds or whether it 
should have been admitted. 
 
Even if the memo's statement about the company's 
investigation into Newman's accident is a subsequent 
remedial measure,3 the district court should have 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Although the memo does not specifically mention Newman's name, it 
is clear from its content and date that it is referring to his fall. 
 
2. The memo could have been redacted to exclude the language regarding 
the "subsequent remedial measure." 
 
3. Arguably, the last few lines of the above excerpt suggest remedial 
action that would fall within the scope of Rule 407: "[A] close inspection 
should have pointed out the damage and the line should have been taken 
out of service." App. at 1279a (emphasis added). However, that inference 
is tenuous at best. 
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determined whether it was nevertheless admissible under 
Rule 407 as impeachment evidence.4 If, as the memo 
suggests, the condition of the rope was such that "a close 
inspection" would have disclosed that the line should not 
have been used, the district court could have rejected 
Truntich's testimony that the rope appeared to have been 
"cut with an axe" and concluded that it was not "just a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
The majority suggests that Kreutzer's memo was unambiguously 
within the scope of Rule 407 and further contends that "there is 
authority supporting the exclusion of evidence of post-accident 
investigations under Rule 407." Majority Op. at 15. In support of its 
position, the majority cites Specht v. Jensen, 863 F.2d 700, 701-02 (10th 
Cir. 1988) and Alimenta v. Stauffer, 598 F. Supp. 934, 940 (N.D. Ga. 
1984). Both cases involved an attempt by one party to admit a document 
specifically for the subsequent remedial measures it contained. As I 
explained above, that is not the case here; Newman clearly only wanted 
to admit the findings from Consolidation's investigation, namely, "that 
the line had suffered prior damage," not the company's response thereto. 
 
This distinction is explained in the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Rocky 
Mountain Helicopters v. Bell Helicopters, 805 F.2d 907 (10th Cir. 1986), 
cited in Specht, 863 F.2d at 702. 
 
It would strain the spirit of the remedial measure prohibition in Rule 
407 to extend its shield to evidence contained in post-event tests or 
reports. It might be possible in rare situations to characterize such 
reports as "measures" which, if conducted previously, would reduce 
the likelihood of the occurrence. Yet it is usually sounder to 
recognize that such tests are conducted for the purpose of 
investigating the occurrence to discover what might have gone 
wrong or right. Remedial measures are those actions taken to remedy 
any flaws or failures indicated by the test. In this case, the remedial 
measure was not the Photoelastic Study of the trunnion but rather 
the subsequent redesign of the trunnion. 
 
Rocky Mountain, 805 F.2d at 918. In Rocky Mountain, all references to 
the redesign were excluded at trial, see id., which is what I suggest could 
have been done with respect to the Kreutzer memo's references to 
Consolidation's post-accident implementation of an inspection policy. 
 
4. If Truntich was an agent of the company, then his statement about 
the rope's condition could be impeached by the statement in the 
company memo. I take no position as to whether the record supports the 
conclusion that Truntich was testifying as an agent of Consolidation 
Coal, however. 
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nice, smooth, straight cut" as Truntich testified. At the very 
least, the memorandum would have corroborated the 
testimony of Thomas Brown, the foreman at the repair 
facility. Brown testified that the rope did not look freshly 
cut. 
 
The majority suggests that the memorandum did not 
directly contradict Truntich's testimony and cites Harrison 
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 981 F.2d 25, 31 (1st Cir. 1992), in 
support of its statement that "Truntich only was offering 
his opinion of the appearance of the line immediately 
following the accident. . . . [T]here must be `a greater nexus 
between the statement sought to be impeached and the 
remedial measure than the case at bar.' " Majority Op. at 
16. However, the appearance of the rope immediately 
following the fall was crucial evidence. Indeed, I can think 
of no other basis for the district court's conclusion that the 
rope had been cut after the fall than how the rope appeared 
immediately afterwards. 
 
In Kenny v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation 
Authority, 581 F.2d 351 (3d Cir. 1978), we allowed evidence 
of new lighting fixtures that were installed on a train 
platform after an assault there to impeach the testimony of 
a SEPTA employee that platform lights were inspected daily. 
In Petree v. Victor Fluid Power, Inc., 887 F.2d 34 (3d Cir. 
1989), we ruled that the district court committed reversible 
error in refusing to admit evidence of a warning decal that 
had been applied years after plaintiff 's injury when that 
evidence was offered to impeach testimony that a 
mechanical press had no inherent dangers. I believe 
Kreutzer's memo could have been admitted for similar 
purposes. 
 
Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that the 
exoneration/limitation proceeding was a bench trial so the 
court's usual concern that the jury will misuse the 
impeachment evidence is absent. Accordingly, the majority 
is far more concerned about the dangers of admitting 
evidence of a "remedial action" than is warranted by the 
circumstances of this case. See majority op. at 16 (quoting 
Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 468 (7th Cir. 
1984)(suggesting that "any evidence of subsequent remedial 
measures might be thought to . . . impeach")). 
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"The reason for the exclusion [of remedial measures after 
an accident] is to encourage post-accident repairs or safety 
precautions in the interest of public safety." Kenny, 518 
F.2d at 351. That public policy is not furthered by 
excluding the language in Kreutzer's memo that simply 
described the condition of the rope and stated that the 
leaving line "had suffered prior damage." App. at 1279a. 
 
Although the district court could have rejected this 
evidence and accepted Truntich's testimony, I believe that 
testimony was so crucial that Newman is entitled to have 
the district court reconsider the admissibility of this 
evidence. If the court determines that there is no other 
obstacle to receiving that memo into evidence, then the 
court should reexamine the question of Consolidation's 
liability in light of this additional evidence. Accordingly, I 
respectfully dissent from section II.F. of the majority 
opinion. 
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